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In spite of the lower overall cancer rates for Navajos as compared with the general United States population, the preceding discussion indicates a steady increase over the course of the century. This can be understood in terms of the theory of epidemiological transition, which suggests that "developing societies," among which Navajo society can in some respects be included, exhibit a shift from the prominence of infectious and parasitic diseases to chronic degenerative and man-made diseases (Broudy and May 1983) . A somewhat simpler explanation is the survival of more older Navajos with chronic disabilities, survival brought about by the gradual improvement in medical care that has eliminated earlier causes of mortality such as tuberculosis (Kunitz and Levy 1981) . For present purposes it will suffice to say that, although cancer is by no means among the leading causes of Navajo mortality, the gradual increase in cancer incidence has not gone unnoticed among Navajos and hence is an increasing source of concern. Source: Based on data provided by the New Mexico Tumor Registry for all IHS Service Units of the Navajo Reservation. a. Overlapping sites in nasopharynx (1 case), in pancreas (1 case), in urinary bladdery (3 cases). b. Over 100 percent due to rounding off.
The Navajo portion of this study was carried out among cancer patients who had utilized two Public Health Service hospitals on the Navajo Reservation, those at Fort Defiance and Tuba City (Figure 1 ). These two hospitals are located in distinct regions of Navajoland, and the patients they serve thus represent a range of internal diversity within Navajo society. The Fort Defiance cachement area is more densely populated and has more forest and grassland areas; its residents are more familiar with Anglo-American society. In contrast, the arid western area around Tuba City is more sparsely populated, and its inhabitants are more accustomed to a traditional Navajo life-style. The more traditional orientation of the west is borne out insofar as a greater proportion of Tuba City patients spoke the Navajo language, adhered to Navajo religion, and had less formal education (Table 2 ). In addition to gathering patient data, I also conducted interviews on more specialized traditional knowledge about cancer with four bicultural medicine men who also work as teachers in the public education system. The Boston portion of the study was carried out among patients in radiation therapy at the Massachusetts General Hospital.4 The fifty-five patients were predominantly Euro-American; ten were American blacks, and two were Haitian blacks. Demographics of the comparison groups (Table 2) indicate expected differences in level of education, with the Boston group considerably more educated, and in religious adherence, especially with regard to the number in the Boston group indicating no adherence. The distribution of cancer types (Table 3) conforms to the expected difference between Navajo and Anglo, with the former showing relatively more disease of the digestive and female reproductive tracts and an absence of lung cancer. This difference suggests that, in general, the comparison groups are diagnostically representative of their respective populations, in spite of the relatively small size of the groups by epidemiological standards.5 likely did much to disseminate the English term "cancer" among Navajos. In the 1970s personnel of the Navajo Area Indian Health Service, in collaboration with traditional medicine men, began a Cancer Control Project designed to increase cooperation between the two health systems. A major goal was to convince medicine men to refer cancer patients for simultaneous medical treatment rather than waiting to see if a traditional ceremony was effective. Requisite to the validity of cross-cultural comparison is determination of whether an indigenous concept exists parallel to that of cancer as a discrete type of illness. To be sure, although oncologists technically regard each cancer as a separate disease, American popular culture recognizes cancer as a global entity. Aside from contact with cosmopolitan biomedicine, there is no immediate necessity for an indigenous nosological system to classify cancers that affect different parts of the body with different symptomatic manifestations as belonging to the same nosological category. In addition, it is relevant to recall Werner's (1965) observation that the Navajo language has never had a large list of named diseases, but rather a series of connotatively overlapping ways of referring to and describing sickness and pain. Thus, neither is there an immediate necessity that cancer be distinguished as a discrete disease entity in the first place.
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The bicultural medicine men consulted placed the origin of cancer, along with other diseases, in the second mythic creation, the yellow world. One 464 JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH dimension of this origin is in sexual abuses committed by the yellow world's inhabitants, such as incest, homosexuality, and transsexuality, and in this way cancer is linked to the venereal diseases. A second dimension is the inhabitants' misguided attempt to control nature and their consequent misuse of natural forces such as radiation and electricity, and in this way Navajos understand why hospitals treat cancer with radiation and dangerous chemicals. At the same time, one medicine man speculated that the most common contemporary Navajo terms for cancer are probably of recent origin ("I don't know, I wasn't at the meeting where those words were decided on"), perhaps coined by people translating for doctors.
In fact, there are two principal Navajo language terms that denote cancer. Both ~46d doo nddziihii (sore that does not heal) and ndatdzid (keeps on rotting) are in common use by patients and Navajo health care professionals alike. The Young and Morgan (1987) dictionary gives "rotten, gangrene, and cancer" as equivalent translations of the word "n!fdzid" and for cancer further specifies nditdzid k'ee'qq noos•beii (the rottenness that spreads as it grows). One medicine man stated that nail~dzid was the only correct Navajo term for cancer, while 166d doo naidziihii was a generalized term that could mean any kind of nonhealing sore. Another recognized both names but distinguished them as two types of disease.
In her medical lexicon, Austin (n.d.) includes the term t66dtsoh (big sore) as a translation of cancer, while Young and Morgan (1987) use the same term to denote smallpox. The term t66d na'aghdazhii (sore that eats you inside) was cited by a Navajo health care professional and by one medicine man as referring to cancer. Young and Morgan (1987) again disagree, translating this term as ulcer. L66d dooyit'iinii (sore you can't see) was also cited by a medicine man. In the term ndkid doo yit'iinii, the word "ndkid" refers to small worms or bugs of sexually transmitted diseases, which create sores and cause rotting regarded as related to cancer. However, none of these terms appears to be common in popular or current professional usage.
Whatever the correct relation among the terms, as a type of disease in the Navajo system, cancer has tended to become a composite etiological category, rather than a purely descriptive one (Good and Good 1982). Although Navajos recognize that cancer can occur in different parts of the body and may affect different parts in men and women, this is not precisely how they would understand the phrase "different cancers." Instead this phrase was described as a composite term in an etiological sense: cancer "caused by snakes, by tornados, or by [sexually transmitted] bugs [germs] all combined together is called niAtdzid."
It is evident, however, that the Navajo terms conceptualize cancer as a sore more than as a growth or tumor. Indeed, another medicine man, speaking in English, indicated a similarity between cancer and boils. Neologisms for tumor exist only in the technical vocabulary prepared by Austin (doo dk6t'~ig66 dinisdehgo, "mass") and the dictionary of Young and Morgan ('atsj' bii' ni'ilts'id, "compact mass within flesh"). This fundamental difference between Navajo and Anglo conceptions might be attributable to more than one source. An external sore is immediately apprehensible as a visible process. Likewise, rotting is a visible process quite familiar to people living in proximity to both domesticated and undomesticated animals, a process which furthermore could easily be extrapolated to the notion of decay as an internal, invisible process. Yet visibility and familiarity alone are inadequate to account for the difference between Navajo and Anglo conceptions, since many tumors can be palpated and since animal butchery could produce knowledge of pathological internal growths. I would suggest, instead, that negative, uncontrolled growth is a less culturally salient metaphor for Navajos than for ourselves. In Navajo thought, growth is inherently positive, whereas degeneration and decay are characteristically negative processes. The traditional Navajo conception of the life cycle is one of rising energy and achievement until age fifty and progressive decline and decay until death at age one hundred. To conceive of cancer as something that "keeps on rotting" is more consistent with such a view, while our own conceptualization of "unchecked growth" is consistent with our fear of nature (and society) out of control. Even the one Navajo patient who used the word "tumor," when questioned about her perception of how the disease worked in her body (pathophysiology), responded that it was probably "eating me inside."
The broader implication of this argument is for the role of metaphor in the relation between culture and illness. Not only can illnesses be used as metaphors of society and social process, as has been argued by Sontag (1978) and others, but the very features and processes that are attributed to illnesses and then projected onto social situations are themselves formulated in terms of dominant cultural metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) . This is not the same as saying, for example, that our perception of tuberculosis is changed by its no longer being associated with hectic passion and creativity. We can still conceive of tuberculosis as a kind of "consumptive" process even if we no longer give the same connotation to consumption. Instead, if a disease is an apt metaphor for certain social processes, it is only because its pathophysiology has already been cast in metaphors generated in the process of social life, metaphors that may not suggest themselves in another society. Thus the metaphorical relation between cultures and illnesses must be understood as reciprocal.
To return to the more immediate question, however, we must determine whether the indigenous Navajo conception admits the possibility that cancer is curable or is invariably fatal. These questions are bound up with the issue, often raised by reservation health care professionals, of whether Navajos tend toward "denial" of serious illness like cancer. In developing the interview, several Navajo consultants advised against direct reference to possible death and specific mention of the term "cancer," since to do so would appear to patients as an invocation of death and disease. In fact, few patients hesitated to name their illness when asked what it was, though only one patient referred explicitly to the imminence of death. Only one patient, who had consented to a hysterectomy in treatment of uterine cancer only after pain and bleeding became severe, exhibited a degree of overt denial, and even she acknowledged that her illness "would have become cancer" if she had not undergone surgery.
To us, the notion of denial implies above all an inadequate process of coping with impending death. Avoiding thoughts about and reference to death may appear rather different from a Navajo perspective. When asked how the illness affected their thoughts, it was common for Navajo patients to insist that they thought only of becoming well, with an overtone that to capitulate to the inevitability of death was a morally inappropriate stance. In a similar vein, one Navajo health educator expressed admiration for an uncle who had died of cancer precisely because the uncle "never gave up hope" up to the moment of his passing. This attitude suggests that it would in some sense be incorrect to acknowledge any disease as necessarily fatal, even if such fears are implicit.
The issue of curability is more complex. Of the four Navajo cancer patients who could not specify the name of their illness, one referred to it as doo bi'ditniinii (that which is not curable), while another emphasized that her illness could not have been "the sore that does not heal" (166d doo nidziihii), since she was now cured. More indirect evidence comes from responses to the question of how traditional healing ceremonies and herbal remedies may have helped. Only two patients claimed to have been definitively cured, one by traditional herbs and one by peyote. Several others stated that the evidence of ceremonial efficacy was to be found not in their cure, but in the brute fact that they were still alive. Though by no means definitive, these statements allude at once both to a liberal criterion of efficacy and to recognition of the possibility of imminent death, while leaving open the question of curability.
In the specialized perspective of bicultural medicine men, the disease is curable. One medicine man who distinguished nai"tdzid and 166d doo nidziihii as two types of disease stated that each has a distinct herbal cure. Naiidzid is cured by azee' hddtdzid, literally "medicine for rotting," which itself is said to have a pungent smell like something that has spoiled. L66d doo nnidziihii is cured by his yiytqnii, "that which eats or dries up pus." Several cancer patients did report having been treated with the latter remedy, although it appears to be used more broadly in treating infections and for patients who have undergone surgery. Adherents of the Native American Church claim that peyote can cure cancer, and narratives of such cures resemble Christian healing testimonies. Finally, one medicine man cited a traditional cure for cancer, known to Hopi, Zuni, Laguna, and Ute peoples but largely "forgotten" by Navajos, in which a dog is ceremonially killed and medicine prepared from its fat.
A more general statement comes from a medicine man informant of Adair's, who cited three ad hoc categories of curability: (1) diseases, like tuberculosis, that the medicine men have given up on and left to white doctors, i.e., intractable contagious diseases; (2) sickness caused by getting close to where lightning has struck, which medicine men can cure; and (3) In sum, cancer is understood to have a mythic origin along with other diseases, although the terms that denote it are of contemporary origin. The Navajo concept of cancer is distinctive in that it defines the processual feature of the disease not in the idiom of growth but in the idiom of rotting, such that cancer is understood as part of a larger class of "sores that do not heal" and "keep on rotting. "At the same time, relative to its use in biomedicine, "cancer" appears to have become transformed from a purely descriptive to a composite etiological category as it has been incorporated into the contemporary Navajo medical system. Although acknowledged to be sometimes fatal, cancer may also be cured. To go further toward understanding the cultural and existential meaning of cancer in the Navajo experience, however, we must examine Navajo causal reasoning about the disease. My findings on Navajo explanations of the causes of cancer (Table 4 ) must be understood against the background of this diversity of causes and effects elaborated within the traditional system. At the same time, the possible role of naturalistic or nonritual causes not included in ethnographic accounts must be entertained, as well as the interaction between Navajo etiologies and those of biomedicine and the popular medical culture of contemporary North America. Injury, the leading cause cited, creates an immediate problem in this respect, since Navajos traditionally distinguish between being "hurt" and "sick," and a distinct category of Navajo ceremonies (Lifeway) is directed toward injuries (Wyman and Kluckhohn 1938). Nonetheless, the idea that an injury can "turn into cancer" appears to be compatible with the awareness that such an injury may not heal properly, i.e., could become a sore that does not heal or keeps on rotting. Lightning, to which I shall return below, witchcraft, and animal violation conform to the traditional pattern of infection by powerful and dangerous forces. Exertion is understandable as a cause of cancer in terms of both the traditional concept of vulnerability in a weakened state and the traditional understanding that old age and death are the result of a gradual wearing down and depletion. Diet, environment, and medication, on the other hand, are typically associated with contemporary conditions of change in traditional life, respectively referring to increasing consumption of junk foods and foods with additives, environmental pollution, and adverse side effects of biomedical treatment. Heredity is a special case here, since two of the three Navajo patients who cited it came from an extended family in which there was a documented presence of a rare genetically based colon cancer. Alcohol consumption, stress, illness, and old age were cited rarely, and the one case of ceremonial contamination was reported by the only medicine man among our patient informants, who stated that the onset of his lymphoma occurred shortly after he performed a ceremony for a woman with a sore throat. These Navajo data are placed in cross-cultural perspective by the comparative data presented in Table 5 . For the Anglo-American data it was possible to distinguish answers to the questions of what patients believed "caused" their disease and what other factors they thought were "related" to their disease, whereas linguistic and conceptual difficulties made such an analysis impossible for the Navajo data. Thus, for Anglo-American patients, the most frequently cited cause was heredity, while the most frequently cited related factor was stress. When "causes" and "related factors" are collapsed into a single category, the ten leading elements of causal construal cited by Anglo-American patients were stress, heredity, injury, smoking, alcohol, diet, medication, illness, X rays, and life-style, in that order. Only five of these leading elements also appeared among the ten causes of cancer most frequently cited by Navajos, and they appeared in a quite different order of priority. Caution must be taken in interpreting these differences, however, as is evident by contrasting our results with those of Linn, Linn, and Stein (1982) on etiological beliefs among Anglo-American cancer patients. In that study heredity and stress were both cited but ranked fourth and seventh, respectively. The three leading elements were smoking, God's will, and type of work (in contrast to the leading elements of stress, heredity, and injury in the present study), and only six of the ten leading elements were also cited by my Anglo-American consultants. Nevertheless, it remains significant that Navajos cited lightning exposure, witchcraft, exertion, old age, animal violation, and ceremonial contamination as causes of cancer--causes that not only were absent from the Anglo-American data but also for the most part were prominent in the Navajo data. The principal overlap that requires interpretation in the causal construals of the two groups is injury. A tentative hypothesis is that, just as the Navajo attribution may be based on the cultural conception that an injury can turn into a sore that does not heal, so the Anglo-American attribution may be based on the cultural conception that an injury can initiate an abnormal growth process, assuming an analogy between the "lump" caused by injury and a tumor. Aside from this, we can conclude that, despite over a century of assimilative pressure and despite the fact that all Navajo patients had received biomedical hospital treatment, the Navajo causal construal of cancer remains culturally distinct from that of Anglo-Americans. Given this general conclusion, we shall take a step further into the Navajo ethnotheory of disease etiology by examining the second leading causal element for Navajos, namely lightning.
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LIGHTNING AS A CAUSE OF CANCER
The single ethnographic fact that poses a dilemma for the present inquiry was clearly stated by Wyman and Kluckhohn (1938:15): "In most cases one factor is thought of as being able to cause a variety of maladies, with one or two outstanding. Likewise, the same disease may result from one of various factors." It is evident from the data in Table 5 that neither Navajos nor AngloAmericans identify a single causal element for cancer in the way one might in the classical model of contagious diseases in biomedicine, although the Navajo causal construal includes a greater diversity of elements. If most factors also may cause a variety of diseases, the question becomes whether lightning bears a specific causal relation to cancer, or whether it is equally a factor in other diseases. Most scholars of Navajo culture agree that lightning is indeed a very commonly cited cause of illness, so data suggesting a more specific relation between lightning and a particular disease must be evaluated very carefully.
A tentative step toward determining how frequently lightning is associated with other diseases at first appeared to disconfirm the specificity hypothesis. A physician colleague reported on ten traditional Navajo patients none of whom had cancer; fully five of them attributed their illness in some degree to lightning. However, two of those patients explicitly told the physician that they feared their problem might turn into cancer. These included a patient who had suffered a direct strike and someone shot by a witch with wood from a lightning-struck tree. A third was suffering from stomach ulcers, which are related to cancer as a member of the class of sores that do not heal.
These data are inconclusive but warrant pursuing the issue. Given that Navajo ceremonials are primarily directed toward removal of whatever etiological factors are determined to be active, indirect evidence can be martialed on the basis of what kinds of traditional healing ceremonies are used for cancer patients. In this respect, we must consider Levy's observation (1983:132) that "no Navajo disease is known by the symptoms it produces or by the part of the body it is thought to affect. . . . Nevertheless, certain groups of healing ceremonies appear to be associated with some symptoms and not others, while several other ceremonies appear to be good for a broad range of symptoms." This issue of generality in the efficacy of healing ceremonies is complicated by the observation that cancer is not a single disease but a class of diseases exhibiting a variety of symptom patterns. However, I have shown above that the concept of cancer has sufficient integrity within Navajo thought to be typically associated with a more or less discrete cause.
The role of lightning in conceptions of cancer causation is affirmed by patients' accounts of their use of traditional healing ceremonies in conjunction with biomedical treatment (Table 6 ). The standard ceremony used to remove adverse effects of lightning is the Shooting Chant (na'at'oee). In contrast, the conceptualization of cancer as a kind of sore (166d) does not appear to prompt the use of those ceremonies described as especially suited for sores and boils, namely Eagleway, Eagle-Trappingway, and Beadway (Wyman and Kluckhohn 1938:29; Sandner 1979:45). A more systematic test can be performed following the method used by Levy, Neutra, and Parker (1987) to establish a degree of specificity in the use of certain ceremonies for seizure disorders and depression. Having ethnographically determined a group of ceremonies that appeared to be associated with these two disorders, Levy compared the proportions of types of ceremonies used by a diagnosed group and a control group. For both groups of disorder, the results were statistically significant. What is important for the present work is that Levy's analysis distinguished disease-specific ceremonies from generalized or "broad-spectrum" ceremonies and that prominent among the latter was the Shootingway group. However, when a similar analysis is done comparing the group of Navajo cancer patients against Levy's control group, the result is that significantly more cancer patients have had Shootingway performed than have members of the control group. This analysis is shown in Table 7 , juxtaposed to the comparable analyses from Levy's work. 6 An additional element of specificity is added by the kind of Shootingway used. Navajo ceremonies are typically divided into male and female versions. Not all informants specified which had been performed over them, but when they did, it was always the male variant, except in one case. This exception was the only medicine man among the patients interviewed, and he prescribed the by a lightning-struck tree) and direct exposure (having contact with lightning itself) or perhaps that 6'oos'ni'ji is a more generalized term for any Shootingways directed toward lightning as an etiological factor. In spite of the statistical support provided by data on ceremonial use, one may justifiably remain uneasy about the specificity hypothesis associating cancer and lightning. A final piece of evidence that supports the association was provided by a reservation physician in primary care. I spoke with this physician following a particularly heavy summer of lightning strikes, which had resulted in numerous patients coming for treatment to the IHS hospital and a consequent wave of prophylactic Shootingway ceremonies among hospital staff exposed to these patients. The physician stated definitively that, although she would not have noticed it if months earlier I had not mentioned my theory about lightning and cancer, she had observed that lightning-struck patients invariably expressed concern that their injuries could turn into cancer. Based on this and the above data, it can be asserted that lightning has more than a chance association with cancer among Navajos.
Given this ethnographic fact, it remains uncertain how old the association may be. Of the two cases of cancer cited by Reichard (1950:97), neither was attributed to lightning. These cases could be interpreted as counter to the present findings or could indicate a change since Reichard's time in the traditional understanding of cancer, a change perhaps related to the awareness that the "radiation" treatment often used for cancer bears some conceptual similarity to lightning. Indeed, one of my medicine man informants compared Navajo and biomedical cancer treatments by noting that, like the hospital doctors, "we Navajos have a radiation ceremony, too." While this question cannot be definitively resolved, more can be said about the place of lightning in Navajo myth, daily life, and the experience of illness. Although patients consistently used the general everyday term for lightning (6'oos'ni'), lightning plays a prominent role in Navajo myth, where it is distinguished into varieties of zigzag ('atsinilttish), forked (hajilgish), and flash or straight (hatso'oolghal). In myth lightning belongs to the class of inherently dangerous or evil things, used by the deities as a tool, weapon, or conveyance (Reichard 1950 ). In another respect, lightning is itself the manifestation of a class of deities or Holy People, the Lightning People.
However, lightning is not only a cosmological fact of life for the Navajo, but an ecological fact of life as well. It is an extremely common feature of the Southwest desert environment, so much so that at certain times of the year one can see several distinct thunderstorms moving across the expanse of sky at the same time. Navajo children learn the same caution about playing around lightning that urban Anglo-American children learn about playing near street traffic. The lesson is brought home by periodic fatalities from lightning strikes, which according to one reservation physician occur at the rate of at least one per year.
The pervasiveness of lightning is illustrated by the diverse circumstances of exposure cited by informants. One man recounted that lightning hit the electric line going to his house and knocked out the power four years prior to his illness, while another told how it hit the telephone line while he was talking, knocking the receiver out of his hand and deafening him as well as initiating his cancer. A woman cited an incident from childhood in which lightning struck an abandoned car in which she was playing with other children, burning some of them, while another recalled from boyhood that lightning struck many times around a wagon in which he was riding. One informant stated that there was a lot of lightning around his ranch, and another related a series of incidents in which he helped revive a lightning-struck cow, the family cornfield was struck by lightning, and he, as a thoughtless youth, counted the bones from lightningstruck sheep.
One man reported that a relative's death from a malignant brain tumor was traced to lightning striking a nearby tree while she was herding. Half her flock was killed, as everything around her turned blue and she inhaled the smell of smoke and burned hair and flesh. She partially blacked out, experiencing numbness throughout her body along with hot and cold flashes, and the campfire was perceptually distorted to appear as if it were a little glowing dot. Over the next several years, she experienced regular headaches, eventually began passing out, and finally had a seizure and was taken to the hospital, where the cancer was diagnosed.
Yet lightning is more than a cosmological and an ecological fact of life; it is also a metaphorical fact of life, insofar as the category of lightning extends beyond storm-caused lightning to other forms of radiant energy. Thus one woman stated that the principal cause of her cancer was that she had picked up her children after they had been knocked out by touching a live electrical wire and only secondarily mentioned that lightning had also struck a building in which she was attending a Peyote meeting, following which she inhaled its smoke; when the cancer subsequently spread to her back, it felt like a lightning shock. For another, the cancer was caused by radiation from a uranium mine, also understood as a form of lightning. Yet another informant was a welder who assimilated his exposure to the flames and fumes of his torch ("the smell got into me") with the experience of having been exposed to natural lightning in boyhood while herding sheep. One informant cited the breathing of fumes while working as a firefighter against a lightning-caused forest fire. Evidence from a patient and a medicine man informant also suggests that exposure to the sun may be considered to be in the same broad category of lightning.
The broader ethnographic conclusion that can be drawn from these data is that the Navajo category of lightning is in fact metaphorically extended in two directions, cosmological and ecological. The literature on Navajo cosmology has long reported that lightning is mythically analogous to snakes, arrows, and other "shooting" phenomena. Indeed, among my informants there were three cases in which snakes were involved in the etiology of cancer and in two of these appropriate ceremonies were performed (see Table 6 ); this may implicate the lightning-snake analogy in the analysis of specificity among causes of cancer. In addition, the category of lightning is metaphorically extended to include such ecological factors as nuclear radiation, sunlight, electricity used for lighting, cooking on ranges or in microwave ovens, and television. One informant reported that one should eat homegrown meat rather than store-bought meat, not because the latter contains chemical preservatives as Anglo-Americans might fear, but because commercial livestock is sometimes subjected to electrical stimulation to enhance growth. Thus it appears that "lightning" in its various aspects is understood by contemporary Navajos to be a principal form of environmental pollution.7
CONSTRUING SPECIFICITY: FOUR METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
Specificity is taken for granted as a goal of scientific research, and it is therefore expectable that we be concerned with identifying forms of specificity in the ethnomedical systems we study. Theorists in medical anthropology have recently developed a variety of analytic frameworks for making sense of the complexity of etiological reasoning encountered in the ethnological record. I have already noted the necessity of distinguishing between etiological and descriptive principles in systems of disease classification (Good and Good 1982). Kleinman (1980) has elaborated a framework for the analysis of specific illness episodes, placing etiological understandings in the context of understandings about the course of illness, pathophysiology, appropriate treatment, and expected outcome, and has emphasized the need to distinguish professional, folk, and popular etiologies. Young (1976) has identified four categories of information coded in explicitly etiological systems, including agencies (immediate causes, precipitating agents, and intermediating or predisposing agents), events or circumstances, instrumental or efficacious actions, and biophysical processes. Zempl6ni (1985) points out that illness etiologies must be understood in the context of how other kinds of misfortune occur as well; not only may an illness be the result of several interacting causes, but a particular cause may produce negative occurrences other than illness. He asks that etiological analysis make careful logical distinctions among instrumental (how) cause, efficient (who or what) cause, and ultimate (why) cause, between causes predicated on temporal sequence and those predicted on a conjunction of circumstances, and between causes determined a priori and a posteriori. Laplantine (1987) offers a series of analytic distinctions-between causes that presume an ontological disease entity and those that refer to a relation between the afflicted and his surroundings, between causes of exogenous or endogenous provenance, between causes that operate by adding a noxious element or subtracting a vital one, and between the ultimately maleficent or beneficent effects of the causal agents.
These considerations go far beyond the kind of specificity dictated by the canons of biomedical science, which has to do with the specificity of diseases as discrete entities (Campbell 1976 ) and the doctrine of specific etiology that presumes one cause for one disease (Dubos 1959) . Their theoretical importance lies in the determination of which of these multiple etiological categories are NAVAJO EXPERIENCE OF CANCER 477 elaborated in particular ethnomedical systems and of the way these categories articulate with broader cultural goals, meanings, and priorities. If, for example, our analytic purpose were only to identify alternative loci of the specific in the Navajo system, we could do so, but this would only beg the broader questions about cross-cultural differences in reasoning about illness. To be sure, my data from bicultural medicine men indicate a measure of specificity between causes and symptoms: killing a dog may cause "gas," attending a funeral may cause numbness, mistreating an aquatic animal may cause diabetes, exposure to lightning may cause heartburn. Likewise, there is a measure of specificity between certain classes of complaint and herbal/animal/mineral remedies: hearing problems should be treated with a preparation from mountain sheep, vision problems with a preparation of the stinkbug, diarrhea with white clay, cancer with a medicine that "smells spoiled." The cultural logic behind these associations is more or less evident, as in the production of heartburn by the burning radiation of lightning or in the sympathetic connection between the rotting of cancer and its treatment by a spoiled-smelling medicine.
The specificity of a relation between cancer and lightning is of a different order, in terms of both defining the disease and identifying causal attributions. As I have noted, even in biomedicine, cancer is as much a group of diseases as a single disease entity, with the link among the diseases being the processual feature of aberrant, unchecked growth. This disease concept is taken up into a Navajo system unaccustomed to specifically named diseases, with a tendency toward etiological rather than descriptive disease concepts, and which interprets the unifying processual feature not as growth but as rotting.
The choice of the term causal construal to represent my empirical findings reflects the nature of the data as a repertoire of causal elements brought to bear by patients afflicted with a particular illness. This term does not distinguish which elements are regarded as specifically causal, as precipitating events, or as predisposing conditions. It also does not differentiate between which elements particular informants were certain about and which they speculated might be involved. Neither does it delineate possible differences between lay attributions and those learned by patients through consultation with specialist medicine men. Most of the Navajo patients generated a causal construal consisting of multiple elements totalling as many as six, with only seven citing a single causal element. In comparison to the Anglo-American data, lightning can thus be understood as a cause of cancer specific to Navajo ethnomedicine, but by no means does lightning conform to the biomedical doctrine of specific etiology. Furthermore, we have seen that lightning itself is a category representing a greater range of phenomena than the meteorological.
Because of the multiplex nature of both cancer and lightning as cultural categories, their causal connection must be understood by a less direct method than those outlined immediately above. One must define the semantic illness network (Good 1977), the system of relevant interrelated concepts within the cultural system. The principal conceptual link in our case is between the understanding of cancer as a rotting sore and the effects of radiation as burning and eating a person's insides. The primary mechanism by which the disease enters a person is inhalation, which can include the electrical fumes of a direct strike, smoke from a lightning-caused forest fire, the rottenness of flesh from a lightning-struck animal, and, by extension, the stench of a rotting road-killed animal. Lightning is the prototypical form of radiation, but radiation is nothing other than a contemporary interpretation of the traditionally broad category of shooting phenomena, albeit with less emphasis on traditional exemplars such as snakes and arrows. The category includes electricity, and the medicine man's statement that "our bodies are made of electrical impulses, " whether or not it indicates an acculturated opinion, is in conformity with the traditional notion that inordinate exposure to such impulses causes disease by disrupting the harmonious electrical balance of life. Radiation also includes the energy of the sun, and it is therefore relevant to the modern occurrence of cancer that the present world is said in Navajo tradition to be destined for destruction by the sun. To have sexual intercourse when the sun is out is said to cause damage to the sperm, and this may be related to the mythical origin of cancer in the abuse of sexuality. A comprehensive semantic illness network would account for the other causes of cancer represented in my data, perhaps with the conclusion that there is no necessary relation among elements in either the cultural repertoire of causes or the causal construals made by individual afflicted persons. In concluding the present discussion, I can go only so far as to sketch a series of methodological issues that would have to be taken into account in such an analysis, issues that tie the analysis of etiological reasoning about illness to broader anthropological concerns. These issues can be framed in terms of four underlying conceptual dichotomies: (1) between cause and symptom, (2) between disease as entity or process, (3) between biomedical and traditional ethnomedical systems, and (4) between body and mind.
First is the dichotomy between cause and symptom in ethnomedical systems, which is related to the distinction cited above between etiological and descriptive systems of disease classification (Good and Good 1982). This dichotomy is directly relevant to the pragmatics of clinical practice, in that determination of cause in many medical systems has implications for choice of treatment. As we have seen, the Navajo disease classification is based primarily on etiology rather than on symptoms and syndromes. Navajos' relatively greater concern with causal factors is empirically evident in comparison to Anglo-American informants in the present study, as the mean number of responses in Navajo causal construals was 2.7, while that for Anglo-Americans was 2.1. Moreover, only three out of twenty-eight Navajos (11 percent) offered no response to questions about causality, while ten out of fifty Anglo-American patients (20 percent) offered no response.8
The relative Navajo elaboration and Anglo-American poverty of causal reasoning reflect more than a cultural divergence in the attention paid to different aspects of the illness experience. The elderly Navajo who complains that they "don't tell me what my illness is at the hospital" may mean not that the doctors failed to inform him of a tumor in his kidney, but they failed to inform him why he has it. In addition, physicians are faced with the fact that their Navajo patients are concerned about lightning as a sufficient cause of illness; even though asymptomatic, a Navajo may be considered sick following exposure to lightning. In general, biomedical professionals unfamiliar with ethnomedical causal construals may remain ignorant of patient fears that a particular course of illness will be determined by exposure to an indigenously defined cause.
A second conceptual distinction is that between disease as entity or process. In a discussion of ontological and relational understandings of disease, Laplantine (1987) shows that both formulations can be found in the cultural history of Western thought about disease. This issue is relevant to a critique of the methodology of biomedicine insofar as comparative (historical and cross-cultural) study throws into relief the role of etiological principles in our own ethnomedical system. Our dominant paradigm is predominantly ontological, defining a "Disease" as a discrete entity or biological "thing":
A Disease is first recognized syndromally--a constellation of clinical features. The Disease has a cause (infective, nutritional, genetic, immunological, etc.); this cause produces characteristic structural changes which in turn cause characteristic functional disturbances which in turn produce the clinical manifestations. (Campbell 1976:50) This author, a prominent biomedical scholar, makes it clear that the kind of specificity required in our paradigm of the Disease leads to a confusing multiplication of conceptual entities that name the same global problem, but which name that problem from etiological, genetic, structural, biochemical, immunological, or prognostic points of view. At the same time, our paradigm ideally seeks to reduce syndromal, functional, and structural understandings to an underlying cause.
The very notion of a cause, however, takes on a particular ontological character because it is understood in relation to the Disease as a thing or entity rather than as a process or event. In the case of Navajo ethnomedicine, it is thus not sufficient to observe a shift in the concept of cancer from descriptive to etiological. As cancer is incorporated into the Navajo cultural pattern, it also becomes less an entity and more an event or process, with a consequent shift in what can be taken to constitute a cause. In broader purview, comparison of etiological systems with or without explicitly defined disease entities should take into account not only their recognition of different kinds of possible causes and of different possibilities for multiple interacting causes, but also the possibility of a different ontological status of the very notion of a cause.
Third, the importance of these problems should not lead one to suppose an indelible distinction between biomedical and traditional systems of causal reasoning. This issue bears directly on the ethnopsychology of cognition, in that causal reasoning reveals the structure of the mind as a capacity for generating propositions and seeking explanations about the world. My data on causal 480 JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH attributions for cancer lead me to conclude that making sense of the illness calls into play distinct modes of causal reasoning, but that these modes apply across Anglo-American and Navajo systems of ethnomedicine. Injury, diet, and environmental exposures such as radiation are included in the causal construals of both groups, though to different degrees and with varying rationales. It is a matter for empirical determination whether such co-occurring elements are indigenous or borrowed. Likewise, it must be determined whether elements from different cultural repertoires are seen to be compatible or incompatible, whether they can be assimilated to one another by metaphorical processes, and whether the interacting cultural repertoires, as wholes, occupy disjunct or integrated cognitive niches.
A striking example of this complexity comes from an interview with a women in her mid-thirties, a high school graduate with job experience in medical social services, who was in apparent remission from breast cancer. In response to a question about traditional treatment and ceremonies, she discussed the causal influence of lightning at some length. Later, when asked specifically about what she thought had caused her illness, she replied thoughtfully that there were three possible factors, which she ranked in order of importance. First was the fact that her grandmother and an aunt had contracted cancer; therefore it could be inherited. Second was that she had once been on a regime of the drug depoprovera, which she felt could have had a carcinogenic effect. Third, and somewhat skeptically, she recalled having been in an auto accident in which she bumped her breast against the steering wheel; she did not lend much credence to this cause but refrained from ruling it our altogether. I then reminded her that she had earlier mentioned a fourth cause, namely exposure to lightning. Appearing somewhat startled, she said, "In that case, I'll make the lightning third and bumping against the steering wheel fourth." Surprised at having the product of traditional causal reasoning juxtaposed to the hierarchical product of a more Anglo-American explanatory model, this woman nevertheless quickly proceeded to integrate the two. The implication is that the Navajo and Anglo-American etiologies are cognitively distinct, but not cognitively incompatible. The problem remains why an explicit question about cause might elicit a response that excludes elements of the traditional repertoire, unless there is a cultural disjunction in forms of reasoning about cause and effect relationships. As I have observed above in citing Adair's medicine man informant and as Benedict (1934) noted long ago about the Dobu, traditional therapeutic systems faced with new diseases may not evolve new therapeutic techniques to cope with them or may define them as outside traditional competence. Likewise, traditional etiological systems may or may not incorporate either new causal elements or new causal rationales.
Finally, the suggestion that there are different modes of causal reasoning leads us to reconsider our methodological reliance on the distinction between body and mind, or in the more precise terms of Evans-Pritchard (1937), between sensible and mystical causes. This issue bears on the existential rationality of culture, for as Lindenbaum (1979:56) has observed, "Beliefs about the etiology of disease are statements about the nature of existence, explanations of why things happen as they do." For most illness, the literature on Navajo ethnomedicine assumes a mystical cause, conceived predominantly as spiritual contagion or violation of taboo. My data suggest that, at least among contemporary Navajos afflicted with cancer, a physical cause (injury) ranks prominently alongside a spiritual cause (lightning). Much more significant, however, the data challenge the assumption that lightning itself can be comprehended solely under the concept of spiritual contagion. This issue was framed in a discussion of Navajo disease etiology by Lamphere (1969:292): Activities involving dangerous animals or natural phenomena [are understood to] automatically arouse the supernatural's attack by weapons or anger, which in turn brings sickness. Until more fieldwork can be conducted on Navajo disease theory, it is only possible to suggest that, in some sense, the natural elements are fused with the supernatural. The snake with which the Navajo might have contact and such diyin dine'e' [supernaturals] as ... the Snake People are, at some level, equated. It is impossible to determine if they are different forms of the supernatural, if the snake is a present-day natural manifestation of supernatural figures of the mythical past, or if they are 2 separate types of phenomena, one natural and the other supernatural, which share common characteristics. Whether one of these possibilities or yet another set of relationships best characterize Navajo beliefs regarding these matters cannot be concluded without more detailed data.9
It can be argued that, stated in this way, the problem is in part an artifact of the distinction between the natural and supernatural that was prominent in anthropology twenty years ago. This methodological distinction has three relevant characteristics. First, it is in essence predicated on distinctions between physical and spiritual, material and immaterial, tangible and intangible, or sensible and mystical, all of which presuppose what is typically called a "Cartesian" distinction between body and mind. Second, it presupposes that the supernatural is more truly "cultural" than the natural, in a manner roughly analogous to the way Kroeber theorized that the superorganic stood in relation to the organic. Finally, the traditional approach focused almost exclusively on the abstract cultural definition of the causal agent, bypassing the question of how that cause produced its effect in terms of a cultural phenomenology.
Anthropology today is better prepared to attend to the physical in a definition of the sacred, bodily experience in an understanding of culture, and concrete ethnomedical practices in addition to beliefs. Examining the causal process associated with exposure to lightning exemplifies this methodological shift.
Patients in the present study who mentioned lightning typically referred to a specific event in which lightning struck so near to them that they saw a bluish flash and inhaled the acrid electrical fumes. To describe this experience they used the Navajo phrase shit hodiittiizh, which can be translated as "I have
